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Michael Tonry
Purposes and Functions of
Sentencing
ABSTRACT
American sentencing systems have fragmented since the modern sentenc-
ing reform movement began in the 1970s and predominant retributive
theories of punishment have become obsolete. Indeterminate sentencing
was ubiquitous, but when it lost credibility, no single approach replaced it.
Every American jurisdiction has a crazy quilt of diverse and, in principle if
not practice, irreconcilable elements. Influential retributive theories of
punishment were a 1970s response to 1970s problems that no longer gal-
vanize opinion or reform. They are incompatible with the recent growth
of restorative and community justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, prisoner
reentry programs, and knowledge about the effectiveness of treatment pro-
grams. Theories of punishment can provide normative criteria by which
policies and practices can be measured, but to be used in that way they
must speak to their own times. New sentencing systems more effective
and more just than current fragmented systems can be developed, and
they will be better if new normative theories germane to them develop in
tandem.
Sentencing policy in the United States has fragmented. There is no
overriding theory or model. There are no widely shared understand-
ings about what sentencing can or should accomplish or about con-
ceptions of justice it should incorporate or reflect. Painting with a
broad brush, utilitarian ideas held sway in the United States from 1900
through the mid- 1 970s (evidenced most strongly by indeterminate sen-
tencing and extensive parole release), followed in succession by retrib-
utive ideas (evidenced most strongly by desert-based guidelines systems
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in Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington) in the 1970s and 1980s, de-
terrent ideas (evidenced most strongly by federal and state mandatory
minimum sentence and truth-in-sentencing laws) in the 1980s, inca-
pacitative ideas (evidenced most strongly by three-strikes, dangerous
offender/sexual psychopath, and sex offender registration and notifi-
cation laws) in the 1990s, and a muddle in the early years of the twenty-
first century. The muddle is exemplified by greatly reinvigorated in-
terest in rehabilitative programs, such as drug, mental health, and
domestic violence courts, reentry programs, and a plethora of new
community-based and institutional treatment programs, combined
with the continuing operation of laws enacted in all the earlier periods
but especially the 1980s and 1990s. Ideas about restorative and com-
munity justice and therapeutic jurisprudence percolate through many
of these initiatives.
Muddles are not necessarily bad. The absence of a stifling orthodoxy
and a limiting conventional wisdom allows for creativity and experi-
mentation, both of which have been evident for a decade. In the longer
term, though, new practices and prevailing views will emerge and they
will be incorporated into new sentencing systems and laws. As that
begins to happen, it will be done better or worse. Thinking through
the purposes and functions of sentencing in liberal democratic societies
may improve chances it will be done better.
American governments did not do a very good job responding to
the collapse of indeterminate sentencing. The developments underly-
ing the collapse-declining confidence in rehabilitative programs, con-
cerns about disparities and racial bias, and lack of procedural fairness-
are well known (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983, chap. 1).
For a short time sentencing policy changes in the forms of sentencing
and parole guidelines and abolition of parole release addressed those
problems in some places. From the early 1980s through the late 1990s,
though, policy makers lost their way. Some of the policies they
adopted, notably mandatory minimums for drug and violent crimes,
truth-in-sentencing laws, and three-strikes laws, worsened the prob-
lems the sentencing reform movement initially sought to address. Sen-
tencing disparities generally and racial disparities in particular wors-
ened, and proportionality links between the seriousness of crimes and
the severity of punishment were broken (Tonry 2005b).
The winds, however, began changing direction again in the mid-
1990s. Renewed possibilities exist for resuming the original efforts to
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achieve fair and effective systems of punishment while taking account
of changing conceptions of justice. Recent Supreme Court decisions
and changes in political and public attitudes toward punishment have
focused attention on sentencing policy to a degree not matched since
the 1980s. The Court decisions fundamentally altered the federal sen-
tencing guidelines, changed the legal context in which state guidelines
operate, and led some states to reconsider the desirability of major
elements of their sentencing systems. Evolving attitudes have produced
significant policy changes in many jurisdictions.
Two decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court significantly altered the
legal environment for guidelines systems. Blakely (124 S. Ct. 2531
[2004]) held that Washington State's system of presumptive sentencing
guidelines was unconstitutional to the extent that it gave judges dis-
cretion to impose prison sentences longer than the maximum author-
ized by the applicable guidelines. Such "upward departures" may be
imposed, the Court asserted, only following a determination, beyond
a reasonable doubt, of the facts on which the longer sentence was
predicated. The Court's rationale was that the upper limits of the
ranges of presumptive sentencing guidelines are equivalent to statutory
sentence maximums; just as a person cannot be sentenced more se-
verely than the maximum authorized by statute for the offense of which
he was convicted, a person cannot be sentenced more severely than
the maximum provided in the applicable guidelines range for that of-
fense. State sentencing commissions had to figure out how best to
comply with Blakely. It was in some ways a harder problem in theory
than in practice;' upward departures are rare in every guidelines sys-
tem.2
Booker (125 S. Ct. 738 [2005]) applied Blakely to the federal guide-
lines. Booker's implications were substantially more radical than Blake-
ly's because the federal guidelines are much more detailed and pre-
scriptive than any state's and because their central feature is the
"relevant conduct" provision that bases sentences not on the offense
of which the defendant was convicted but on the "actual offense be-
'One option is to apply it literally and compel prosecutors to charge and prove ag-
gravating factors that might justify a harsher than normal sentence; prosecutorial failure
to do so would preclude an above-guidelines sentence. A second is to create a postcon-
viction mechanism for jury consideration of aggravating factors at the sentencing stage.
A third is to replace presumptive guidelines with voluntary ones. Most states with pre-
sumptive guidelines adopted the second option (Reitz 2005b).
2 In Washington State in 2005, e.g., only 0.6 percent of standard cases involved upward
departures (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 2005, table 10).
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havior" determined by the judge to be present on the basis of a civil-
law "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Booker in practice ap-
plied to most sentences imposed in federal courts. The Supreme Court
had to decide whether its decision required that the entire guidelines
system be struck down. It elected to leave the guidelines in effect but
with "advisory" rather than "presumptive" or "mandatory" force.
Judges must calculate the advisory sentence post-Booker exactly as they
would have earlier but may reject the guidelines' "advice" and impose
some other sentence as long as they give reasons for doing so. By
making the guidelines advisory, the Court empowered judges more
often and more easily to impose sentences less harsh than those pre-
scribed by the pre-Booker guidelines.
Independently of the guidelines developments, public and political
attitudes toward criminal justice policy have been changing for a de-
cade. The Supreme Court decisions themselves, prohibiting sentencing
policies in effect for two decades, are one sign of this. So is an earlier
decision of the California Supreme Court, the People v. Alvarez (60 Cal.
Rep. 2d 93 [1997]), which greatly weakened California's fearsome
three-strikes law.3 Another is the proliferation of drug, gun, domestic
violence, and mental health courts, all premised on taking problem-
solving rather than solely punitive approaches to offending (Nolan
2001; Casey and Rottman 2003; Redlich et al. 2005). A third is the
passage of California's Proposition 36, and similar referenda in other
states and the District of Columbia, mandating diversion from prose-
cution and into treatment of many drug-abusing offenders (Tonry
2004b, chap. 1). A fourth is the adoption of laws in many states in-
tended to reduce prison populations and costs by altering mandatory
minimum sentencing laws, creating new alternatives to imprisonment,
and authorizing new and broader programs of early release (Butterfield
2003). A fifth is the proliferation of new programs, usually at grassroots
levels, based on ideas about restorative and community justice (Clear
and Karp 1999; Braithwaite 2002). A sixth is the rapid expansion of
the "prisoner reentry" movement predicated on the belief that we know
'At least some California and U.S. Supreme Court justices would deny that the de-
cisions occurred because the elected branches of government were politically immobilized
from repealing or fundamentally altering sentencing systems that nearly all informed
people considered deeply unjust and the courts decided they had to step in; it is hard,
however, to imagine that the justices were unaware of the systems' fundamental problems
and of the intractable political difficulties that precluded legislative solutions and that
their decisions would address the problems while sidestepping the politics.
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how to help offenders avoid reoffending (Travis 2005; Travis and
Visher 2005).
Sentencing reform seemed a much simpler subject in the 1970s than
it does now. The widely shared and recognized aims then were to
reduce sentencing disparities generally and in relation to race, to make
judges more accountable for their decisions, and to make the sentenc-
ing process more transparent (Frankel 1972; Morris 1974). Few people
saw sentencing reform as a way to prevent crime or as the proper
subject of partisan politics. As a result, the proponents of change even
in a state as traditionally partisan as California included liberal and
conservative legislators, police unions and prisoners' rights advocates,
and defense lawyers and prosecutors (Messinger and Johnson 1978).
Sentencing reform seemed straightforward, raising practical and policy
issues about which reasonable people disagreed, but, at least politically
and ideologically, it appeared to be relatively noncontentious. 4
The trial and error of the past three decades has left lessons to be
learned that, if heeded, can help contemporary policy makers do better
than their immediate predecessors. We know much more about sen-
tencing and the effects of different policy approaches than we did thirty
years ago. Here are the main lessons:
" Well-designed systems of presumptive sentencing guidelines can
reduce disparities, make sentencing more consistent and predict-
able, attract support from most judges and prosecutors, and pro-
vide a policy tool for predicting and managing correctional re-
source needs (Tonry 1996, chaps. 2-5; Reitz 2001).
" Some systems of voluntary sentencing guidelines have been used
successfully to predict and manage correctional resources, but
there is no credible evidence that they reduce disparities (Tonry
1996; Frase 2005c).
'That sentencing reform was widely seen as noncontentious in the 1970s seems po-
litically naive in retrospect and therefore probably is not true. A more plausible view is
that people recognized that various proponents of change had different policy and political
agendas in mind but failed to anticipate how partisan and ideological crime control policy
would later become and how starkly different the ramifications of the different agendas.
When California adopted its Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law of 1976, more than
a decade had passed since Barry Goldwater raised crime in the streets as a campaign issue
in 1964, and President Richard Nixon had already launched wars on drugs and crime
(Edsall and Edsall 1991). No one then would have predicted that Willie Horton, a black
murderer and rapist, would play a major role in the 1988 presidential election (Anderson
1995) or that Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton in 1992 would campaign
on the basis that he was tougher on crime than the Republicans (Gest 2001).
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" Mandatory minimum sentencing laws, including three-strikes laws,
are inconsistently applied, provoke widespread circumvention, pro-
duce gross disparities in the treatment of similarly situated offend-
ers, and sometimes result in sentences that all involved believe to
be unjustly severe (Merritt, Fain, and Turner 2006; Tonry 2006).
" Well-run and well-targeted treatment programs of a variety of
sorts have been demonstrated to be capable of achieving significant
reductions in reoffending (Gaes et al. 1999; Halliday 2001; Welsh
and Farrington 2006).
" Restorative justice programs of diverse kinds have been shown to
be preferred to regular criminal justice processes by offenders and
victims alike, more likely to result in offenders' successful comple-
tion of resulting obligations, and no more likely to result in reof-
fending (Braithwaite 2002).
With that knowledge, and the aspiration to do so, we could build
sentencing systems that take account simultaneously of the state's re-
sponsibilities to respect its citizens' liberties and autonomy and to as-
sure the stability and security that allow people to live their lives in
peace.
Building sentencing systems that are rational, just, and effective
starts with understanding what sentencing is for and what it can do.
This essay therefore examines the purposes and functions of sentencing
and sentencing reform. Unless we are clear about them, we will not
have much success at designing sensible, effective, and workable sys-
tems for the twenty-first century.
"Sentencing reform" means different things to different people, de-
pending on whether the proponent wants sentencing made softer,
tougher, fairer, more consistent, more efficient, more economical, more
transparent, or more effective at preventing crime. Whether a pro-
posed change counts in the eyes of others as a reform depends on what
the proponent wants to accomplish and whether others think that a
good thing.
The same observations apply to sentencing. Whether a sentencing
system or practice can be said to work well depends on its purposes,
what it is supposed to do, and how well it does that. Generally when
people discuss the "purposes" of punishment, they refer to normative
rationales such as retribution or crime prevention through deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and moral education.
Examination of normative purposes, and how adequately and con-
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sistently they are manifested in sentencing policies and practices, how-
ever, is only the beginning of analysis of the effectiveness of a sen-
tencing system. Practitioners and policy makers want sentencing to
accomplish other things as well. They include efficiency, cost-effec-
tiveness, and public confidence. They also sometimes want sentencing
systems, and legislation affecting them, to help them achieve personal
goals, advance ideological agendas, and pursue partisan political objec-
tives. Pursuit of all these aims can be thought of as a "function" of
sentencing or sentencing reform.
Functions can be thought of instrumentally, as though sentencing
systems and policies were machines. Whether a machine can be said
to work well depends on what it is supposed to do, and typical occu-
pants of various institutional roles sometimes differ about that. Dis-
tinctions need to be made among primary functions, the things we want
to do directly; ancillary functions, other things related to primary func-
tions that we also want to accomplish; and latent functions, collateral
things some people want to accomplish that are unrelated to the aims
of primary or ancillary functions.
Primary and ancillary functions are straightforward because they are
instrumental. Certain things are done in pursuit of certain aims. Latent
functions are more complex because, while they can be instrumental,
they need not be. They can be thought of in terms of social function-
alism, doing things whether we want them to or not, and whether we
are aware they do them or not. Loic Wacquant has argued, for ex-
ample, that American punishment policies since 1970 have served to
maintain racial hierarchy in the United States, something achieved in
earlier generations through slavery and then through Jim Crow laws
and related social conventions (Wacquant 2001). Contemporary pun-
ishment policies need not consciously have been directed at that result,
but that is what (Wacquant would say) they have done and what ac-
cordingly can be thought of as one of their latent functions. A more
benign Durkheimian example of a not necessarily purposive latent
function is the norm-reinforcing (or undermining) effects of imposition
of particular punishments for particular crimes (Durkheim [1893]
1933). Some judges may have this in mind when they impose sen-
tences, but it will happen whether they do or not.
For the rest of this essay, I set noninstrumental latent functions aside.
Here I am interested in instrumental latent functions, things practi-
tioners and policy makers want to accomplish that are unrelated to the
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primary functions of punishment and prevention. The most common
of these are pursuing the actor's personal self-interest, pursuing par-
tisan political objectives, and bearing witness to ideological beliefs.
People setting sentencing policy or imposing sentences in individual
cases have multiple motives and pursue diverse objectives, and these
may be more or less legitimate. The primary functions of sentencing,
most people would agree, are imposition of appropriate punishments
and prevention of crime. People differ on what makes a punishment
appropriate and how best to prevent crime, but few people would dis-
agree that these are legitimate functions.
There are greater disagreements about the ancillary functions. Some
people believe that defendants must be offered incentives to plead
guilty in order to manage case loads; others believe that inappropriate.
Some people believe that maintaining good personal and professional
relations with others in the courtroom work group can justify plea
bargains that might not otherwise be countenanced; others disagree.
Some people, especially corrections officials, believe that judges should
take resource considerations into account when setting sentences; oth-
ers, especially judges, disagree. These disagreements are the products
of different conceptions of justice but relate closely to considerations
of appropriate punishments and effective crime prevention.
Few people would disagree that some latent functions are palpably
illegitimate. For example, in order to win favorable publicity, a judge
up for a vigorously contested reelection might impose a much harsher
sentence in a particular case than can be justified in his own mind or
than at other times he would. The latent function would be winning
reelection, and few would regard that as a legitimate reason to punish
an offender especially severely. Nor would most judges themselves re-
gard it as legitimate: a judge would be little more likely publicly to
justify a sentence "because that sentence will help me get reelected"
than "because my daughter is the prosecutor,". "because I'm in a bad
mood today," or "because I always punish Hispanics more harshly than
whites." Policy decisions or individual sentences that result not from
good-faith efforts to achieve the ends of appropriate punishment or
effective crime prevention but from the decision maker's wish to
achieve other unrelated personal, ideological, or political goals are il-
legitimate.
If future sentencing systems are to be more successful than their
recent predecessors, they must attend to both purposes and functions.
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Many initiatives of the past two decades failed to address purposes
coherently. The best examples are broad three-strikes laws such as Cal-
ifornia's (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001), the federal 100-to-one
crack/powder cocaine sentencing differential (McDonald and Carlson
1993), and many mandatory minimum sentence laws for drug offenses
(Tonry 2006). These all resulted in individual sentences that those
obliged to apply them often found unjustly severe, and all violated
commonsense notions of the relative seriousness of the crimes they
affected and other more serious crimes that they did not.
Some misconceived laws resulted from policy makers' overreaction
to emotional incidents, such as the death of college basketball star Len
Bias, apparently from a crack cocaine overdose, commonly credited as
driving the enactment of the federal 100-to-one law (Kennedy 1997).
Others may have resulted from simple failures to understand the im-
plications of seemingly straightforward changes. Many, however, re-
sulted not from confused purposes or failures to forecast a law's effects
but from the use of sentencing "reforms" to achieve personal, partisan,
and ideological goals. Put differently, illegitimate latent goals displaced
legitimate primary and ancillary goals. The inevitable result is that
individual human beings, like the hypothetical defendant sentenced
more severely to help the judge get reelected, received unjust punish-
ments.
Doing better requires two things: first, that both purposes and func-
tions be considered in setting sentencing policy, so that primary and
ancillary functions can be taken into account in ways that do not pro-
duce individual injustices; second, that illegitimate latent functions be
recognized for what they are and eschewed. The second of these can
never be completely successful since that would require that human
nature be changed. Policy makers may be able, however, to do better
than they recently have done if they come to understand that sentenc-
ing has multiple functions, that ethical policy making requires that they
be recognized, and that many of the latent functions cannot be openly
and honestly acknowledged without embarrassment.
The rest of this essay provides the analysis on which the preceding
observations rest. Section I sets out a fuller framework for thinking
about purposes and functions of sentencing. Sections II and III, apply-
ing that framework, examine current knowledge concerning the pri-
mary and ancillary functions. Section IV examines latent functions.
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The last distills lessons honest policy makers might wish to consider
as they devise the sentencing systems of the twenty-first century.
If only legitimate primary and ancillary functions were to be sought
to be performed and account were taken of what has been learned from
the last thirty years of changes in sentencing laws, here is what a ra-
tional, just, and effective sentencing system would look like:
" Only normative purposes and legitimate primary and ancillary
functions of sentencing would be taken into account in setting
sentencing policy or setting sentences in individual cases, and il-
legitimate latent functions would be eschewed in both contexts.
" Limiting retributivism, the idea that retributive concerns can set
meaningful upper and lower bounds within which other consid-
erations may validly be taken into account in setting sentences in
ordinary cases, would be adopted as the system's primary norma-
tive rationale, and its scope would be extended to encompass both
purposes and functions.
" Subject to that premise, guidelines would set out ranges of pre-
sumptive sentences from within which judges would normally se-
lect sentences in ordinary cases; but judges would have authority,
subject to observance of the requirements of Booker and Blakely, to
depart from guidelines to impose other sentences as long as they
specified for the record their reasons for doing so.
" In setting presumptive sentencing ranges, policy makers would not
take into account evidence on deterrent and incapacitative effects
of sentencing but would authorize judges to take such evidence
into account in setting individual sentences within (but not above)
presumptive ranges.
" In promulgating sentencing guidelines, policy makers would au-
thorize judges to take account of rehabilitative and restorative pro-
grams and possibilities to individualize sentences both within and
below (but not above) presumptive ranges, in the latter case as long
as they specified for the record their reasons for doing so.
" All mandatory minimum, including three-strikes, laws would be
repealed.
I. A Framework
The fundamental purposes and primary functions of sentencing are
clear, and are the same: to punish criminals and prevent crimes. There
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are, however, other functions that concern officials and policy makers.
They range from encouraging most defendants to plead guilty and
managing criminal justice budgets to reassuring the public and getting
reelected.
People concerned primarily with the word justice in "criminal jus-
tice" would say that the overriding purpose of sentencing is the im-
position of punishments that are just relative to prevailing normative
criteria; the overriding functional goal would be to ensure, or at least
maximize the likelihood of, imposition of just punishments according
to those criteria. People concerned primarily with the word "criminal"
would say that the overriding purpose of sentencing is the prevention
of crime and accordingly that the overriding functional goal is to min-
imize the incidence of crime and its consequences. To distinguish the
question of what purposes should be pursued from the question of
whether laws have been fairly and effectively applied relative to those
purposes, I refer to the first as purposes and the second as distributive
functions.
The distinction between purposes and functions may appear a bit
obscure, but it should not be. Richard Frase and I were recently asked
by the editors of the Stanford Law Review to write separate essays on
purposes (Frase 2005a) and functions (Tonry 2005a) of sentencing. Ini-
tially we thought the distinction a bit artificial but decided it was not,
for two main reasons. First, normative purposes provide the theoretical
criteria for deciding whether sentences imposed on individual offenders
are just or appropriate, whereas distributive functions relate to how
well or poorly any particular sentencing system distributes sentences
according to those criteria. Second, sentencers and designers of sen-
tencing systems have multiple functions in mind when they make de-
cisions, and some of them, such as managing resources effectively, are
entirely independent of normative purposes of sentencing.
All mainstream contemporary theories include crime prevention
among the purposes of punishment, though they vary widely in what
ways, with what weight, and subject to what constraints prevention may
be taken into account. Most people, however, believe that prevention
and diminution of crime, fear of crime, and their consequences are
important and legitimate functions of sentencing. These are the pre-
ventive functions.
Many practitioners would also include efficiency, cost-effectiveness,
and resource management among the functional goals of an acceptable
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sentencing system. Managers need to set and pursue substantive pri-
orities, allocate personnel and resources, meet performance goals, and
operate within their budgets. They also need to maintain good working
relations with other agencies and officials who can make their work
easier or harder, and thereby make achievement of other goals easier
or harder. These are management functions.
Some policy makers and analysts urge that it is important that gov-
ernments reassure the public, maintain confidence in the legal system,
denounce wrongful behavior, and reinforce basic social norms. Con-
temporary analyses of "expressive" policies emphasize government of-
ficials' wishes and needs to assure the public that things are being done
to address subjects that trouble them (Garland 2001). Recent work on
legitimacy and procedural justice emphasizes that justice needs to be
seen to be done (Tyler 2003). Durkheimian analyses portray criminal
law as a primary contributor to maintenance and refinement of basic
social norms and its dramaturgical features as key sources of social
cohesion (Durkheim [1893] 1933). These are communicative functions.
The first two of these, distribution and prevention, concern primary
goals (what sentencing "is supposed to do"). The third, management,
is an ancillary goal (how institutional imperatives can be acknowledged
while pursuing primary goals).
The fourth, communication, is the most complex and multifaceted
and operates at all three functional levels. Communication of legal
threats and acknowledgment in court processes and outcomes of basic
social norms are necessary to achieve the primary goals of distribution
and prevention. Communication about court processes and procedures
and likely punishments is key to achievement of a variety of manage-
ment goals. These might, however, be thought of as incidental com-
ponents of primary and ancillary functions. To avoid repetition, I dis-
cuss communicative functions among the ancillary functions, even
though each of the three functional levels includes communicative el-
ements.
The more controversial forms of communication relate to latent
functions. Practitioners and policy makers are sometimes moved by
personal, ideological, and partisan objectives. People sometimes make
decisions or support policies because it is in their personal self-interest,
because they want to bear witness to their ideological beliefs, or be-
cause they want to pursue partisan political advantage. Earlier I pro-
vided an example of a judge imposing a harsher than otherwise sen-
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tence in order to help his reelection prospects. A parallel example for
policy making is the legislator or governor who proposes policy
changes he knows will not achieve their purported primary aims and
will, if enacted, cause new injustices, because he hopes their enactment
will help him get reelected (e.g., California Governor Pete Wilson's
three-strikes proposal: Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin [2001]).
In the preceding paragraphs, I identified a number of purposes and
functions:
A. Purposes (belaboredly, these could be called normative functions)
B. Primary functions
1. Distribution (consistency, evenhandedness, fairness)
2. Prevention (crime, fear of crime, costs and consequences of
both)
3. Communication (threat communication, denunciation of
wrongful behavior, reinforcement of basic social norms)
C. Ancillary functions
1. Management (efficiency, cost-effectiveness, resource man-
agement)
2. Communication (procedural justice, legitimacy, public con-
fidence)
D. Latent functions
1. Self-interest
2. Ideology
3. Partisanship
4. Communication
Normative purposes provide the ultimate criteria by which the just-
ness of a punishment system is assessed. The most important of the
remaining functions are the distributive functions of doing justice and
the preventive functions of minimizing crime and its consequences.
These can be pursued effectively only if account is taken of the im-
plications and constraints associated with the ancillary functions and if
ways can be devised to limit pernicious influences of the latent func-
tions.
II. Purposes and Primary Functions
The pre-Booker federal sentencing guidelines are a case study in what
can happen when policy makers fail to be clear about their purposes
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and functional goals. Here are four examples. First, the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission did not make the guidelines' normative purposes clear.
It could have; the exceedingly detailed guidelines fine-tuned sentencing
to circumstances (e.g., weapons, victim injury, property loss, role in the
offense) that relate closely to culpability and thus were largely conso-
nant with retributive purposes. Instead, the commission chose not to
make the "profoundly difficult" choice of adopting explicit purposes,
electing instead "an empirical approach that uses data estimating the
existing sentencing system as the starting point" (1987, pp. 1.3-1.4).
Guidelines for drug crimes were a major exception to the "empirical
approach," with the result that the guidelines prescribed much harsher
punishments for drug crimes than for violent crimes that most people
consider more serious and thereby violated widely held proportionality
notions. Probably the single most recurrent criticism by practitioners
was that the guidelines sentences for drug cases were unjustly severe.'
This led to widespread circumvention, which increased as time passed
(Bowman and Heise 2001). Adopting explicit purposes, and then being
guided by them, would have produced guidelines that were more in-
ternally consistent and normatively acceptable to practitioners and
would more effectively have performed their distributive functions.
Second, the commission was worried that lawyers would manipulate
the guidelines by means of charging and plea bargaining decisions and
adopted the "relevant conduct" policy as a countermeasure. The logic
was that if judges were required to impose sentences on the basis of
the defendant's "actual offense behavior," charges to which the defen-
dant pled guilty would generally not much matter (U.S. Sentencing
Commission 1987, pp. 1.5-1.6). 6 In practice, the system did not work
that way. The sentencing guidelines were widely circumvented by pros-
ecutors, defense lawyers, and judges (Nagel and Schulhofer 1992;
Schulhofer and Nagel 1997; Bowman and Heise 2001). The notion
that offenders are to be punished for what the judge believed they did,
as opposed to what they were convicted of, offended widely held no-
tions of procedural fairness and produced such unjust results that the
Supreme Court intervened in Booker and demoted the guidelines from
'A survey of federal appellate and trial judges conducted by the commission found
that 73.7 percent of district court judges and 82.7 percent of circuit court judges reported
that drug-trafficking sentences were "greater than appropriate" (U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission 2003, exhibits 11-4, 111-4).
'The major exception is that guidelines are trumped by plea bargains to offenses
bearing lower statutory maximums than guidelines prescribe.
Purposes and Functions
strongly presumptive to advisory. The fundamental difficulty was that
policy makers in the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, and the U.S. Congress cared less about sentencing's
distributive functions than did the judges and prosecutors whose job it
was to apply them.7
Third, by attempting to constrain prosecutorial choices radically, the
guidelines failed to acknowledge practitioners' needs to achieve various
management goals and thereby obstructed performance of ancillary
functions practitioners believed important. Judges and prosecutors typ-
ically believe that the smooth operation of the courts depends on high
rates of guilty pleas and that incentives are necessary to induce them.
This is one of the foreseeable reasons why the guidelines often were
circumvented.
Fourth, the guidelines failed to perform some of their communica-
tive functions adequately; through their rigidity and severity and the
relevant conduct rule, they undermined perceptions of their own le-
gitimacy in the eyes of the judges and lawyers who were expected to
implement them. Legal rules that possess moral legitimacy are much
more likely to be followed than those that do not.
Judges and prosecutors see themselves as in the business of doing
justice. Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and probation officers
work together on an ongoing basis in most courtrooms. Shared un-
derstandings evolve about "going rates" and about reasonable and un-
reasonable sentences and modes of official behavior (Eisenstein, Flem-
ming, and Nardulli 1988, p. 376). Practitioners in work groups believe
that the standards they observe and apply are good ones, not merely
cynically because observing those standards helps them accomplish
what they want to do, but because the standards are normatively ap-
propriate and result in reasonably just results. Arthur Rosett and Don-
ald Cressey described this in their report on plea bargaining in Cali-
fornia: "Even in the adversary world of law, men who work together
and understand each other eventually develop shared conceptions of
what are acceptable, right, and just ways of dealing with specific kinds
'The best illustrations of this are the Congress's enactment in 1986 of mandatory
minimum sentences for drug crimes that required sentences much harsher than were
typically imposed for violent crimes and the commission's decisions to incorporate even
more severe drug crime penalties into the guidelines than the Congress prescribed (Tonry
1996, pp. 96-98). These decisions had the effect of making sentences much severer and
the guidelines much more complicated than they needed to be to pursue sentencing's
legitimate primary and ancillary functions.
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of offenses, suspects, and defendants. These conceptions form the bases
for understandings, agreements, working arrangements, and coopera-
tive attitudes. Norms and values grow and become a frame of reference
which prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and experienced offenders
all use for deciding what is fair in each case" (1976, pp. 90-91).
When laws or guidelines prescribe sentences that are harsher than
most practitioners believe reasonable or just, there is a problem. When
laws require that sentences be calculated primarily by means of me-
chanical scoring systems, as the federal guidelines did, rather than by
looking closely at the circumstances of individual cases, as most prac-
titioners believe justice requires, there is a problem. Judges and lawyers
are socialized into both enforcing the law and doing justice. When
they cannot do both, doing justice often trumps enforcing the law,
especially when, as in the case of the federal guidelines, the law lacks
moral authority. The federal guidelines, however, were but an extreme
instance of a wider failure to take conscious account of sentencing's
multiple and sometimes conflicting purposes and functions.
A. Purposes (Normative Functions)
The overriding normative function of a sentencing system in a so-
ciety committed to individual liberty, procedural fairness, and limited
powers of government is to assure that individuals convicted of crimes
receive the sentences that, in principle, they should. Those final words
are purposely indeterminate about the principles that should govern.
Preponderant views about this vary across time and space. For most of
the twentieth century through the 1970s, utilitarian ideas about crime
prevention through rehabilitation and incapacitation were predominant
(Rothman 1980); they have not gone away, but in more recent decades
they have been eclipsed by retributive and just deserts emphases on
the desirability of apportioning the severity of punishment to offend-
ers' blameworthiness (e.g., von Hirsch 1976; von Hirsch and Ashworth
2005).' Interest in rehabilitation has revived in the early twenty-first
century (as evidenced by drug and similar courts offering individual-
ized, treatment-based dispositions, a plethora of new treatment pro-
grams in institutions and in the community, and the "prisoner reentry"
8 If one assumed that policy making since the mid-1980s was implicitly based on prin-
cipled ideas about purposes, they would be a not very coherent mixture of retributive
and preventive purposes; I know of no scholar who has attempted to delineate a normative
theory that would justify recent policies.
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movement), and interest in restorative (Braithwaite 2002) and com-
munity justice (Clear and Karp 1999) and in therapeutic jurisprudence
(Winick and Wexler 2003) has burgeoned. These developments may
signal an immanent shift in preponderant views.
Immanuel Kant, the German idealist philosopher whose ideas are
often regarded as marking the beginning of development of modern
theories of retributive punishment, argued that the only morally ap-
propriate justification for punishment is that it is deserved and is ap-
propriately apportioned to the offender's wrongdoing (Kant [1796]
1887). Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1970), the bellwether of utilitarianism,
to the contrary, argued that only net positive preventive effects-
achieved usually through deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion-can justify the imposition of pain that punishment entails. A
Benthamite corollary, commonly referred to as the principle of parsi-
mony, forbids imposition of pain that is not outweighed by pains
averted.
The normative choices involved in deciding what principles should
govern sentencing have important ethical and moral dimensions about
which reasonable people differ, sometimes fundamentally, and the
choices sometimes have radically different implications for policy. A
thoroughgoing Kantian theory of sentencing would predicate just pun-
ishments on the relative degree of blameworthiness imputable to the
offender on the basis of his culpability and, perhaps, the harm he has
caused.9 There would be no room in the calculus for incapacitative
concerns based on predictions of dangerousness, deterrent concerns
based on belief that prospective wrongdoers might be dissuaded, re-
habilitative concerns aimed at enhancing the offender's prospects for
law-abidingness, or restorative concerns aimed at healing broken re-
lationships, unless they could be achieved within the scope of a sen-
tence justified in retributive terms.
Conversely, a thoroughgoing Benthamite theory of sentencing
would allow those various crime-preventive concerns to be acted on
irrespective of the seriousness of the offender's culpability, constrained
only by the parsimonious principle that no punishment cause greater
harm, taking offenders into account when making the calculation, than
'Or, some might say, the harm he foreseeably caused, but this is redundant since
foreseeability of harm is an element of any coherent conception of culpability.
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it prevents."° Ultimately, a utilitarian calculus could justify imposition
of a very serious punishment on an offender who committed a venial
offense, or even on an innocent person whom everyone except the
judge believed to be guilty."
No American jurisdiction has ever created a punishment system
based on thoroughgoing retributivist or utilitarian premises, but several
have come close. Washington State sentencing guidelines in the 1980s
were primarily based on just-deserts reasoning, appellate courts enthu-
siastically monitored judicial compliance, parole release was abolished,
and the only conditions to which probationers and parolees could be
subjected related to their criminality (Boerner and Lieb 2001). The
federal sentencing guidelines, even though the commission insisted it
had not adopted normative premises, were rigid and prescriptive and
closely apportioned sentences to detailed offense characteristics that
most people would have little difficulty relating to relative blamewor-
thiness. Until California abolished parole release in 1976, all prison
sentences were for "one year to the statutory maximum," and in theory
prisoners were to be released only when they had been rehabilitated
or no longer required incapacitation. California's parole system, how-
ever, is long since gone, Washington's guidelines have changed in many
respects, and the federal guidelines have been eviscerated.
There are good reasons why no relatively philosophically pure sen-
tencing system exists or has been seriously proposed at a policy level.
The Kantian and Benthamite visions offer models that identify impor-
tant moral choices, trade-offs, and compromises. Neither, however, can
be converted to the real world. The Kantian ideal has well-known
problems. Its claim that respect for individuals' moral autonomy re-
quires that we punish them "in like kind," perfectly commensurately
with the wrongdoing embodied in their crimes (Pincoffs 1991, pp.
'01 ignore for purposes of this essay the complexity of distinguishing between rule and
act utilitarianism and the practical problems of ever knowing enough to make the nec-
essary utilitarian calculations.
" The accusation that utilitarians must be prepared, if true to their principles, to punish
innocent but apparently guilty people is a classic retributivist objection to utilitarianism.
Utilitarians generally reply that information about such punishments of innocents would
inevitably slip out and foster a general sense of insecurity ("it could happen to me") that
would be more harmful than any preventive gains fleetingly gained from the undeserved
punishment (Hart 1968, p. 25). It is an irresoluble argument but a red herring. Harsh
punishments of people guilty of trifling crimes raise the same problem. No one argues
that a utilitarian system would prohibit harsh punishments for minor offenders on the
basis of deterrent, incapacitative, or rehabilitative considerations, as long as the parsimony
principle is observed.
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16-17), cannot be converted into practicable policy. Killing a murderer
fits the model, but what about the punishment for an attempted mur-
derer? How can a rape be punished in like kind or, harder, an at-
tempted rape? Would anyone really want to torture or maim an as-
sailant who caused serious pain or disfigurement? How can deserved
punishments for property crimes be calculated, or "victimless" crimes,
or inchoate crimes (conspiracy, attempts, aiding and abetting)?
People have tried to solve these problems, but the solutions neces-
sarily are imperfect. Andrew von Hirsch devised a system of ordinal
proportionality in which punishment in absolute like kind is not sought
but punishment proportionate to the blameworthiness expressed in the
crime (von Hirsch 1993). "Proportionality" here, however, is not rel-
ative to the nature of the crime but to punishments for other more,
less, and comparably blameworthy crimes. The difficulties here,
though less well known than those affecting a purer Kantian model,
are also considerable (Tonry 2005b). There are three principal ones.
First, the principled call for comparable punishments for comparably
situated offenders is illusory. Widely divergent practices concerning
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing discounts for guilty pleas
make seemingly comparable offenses of conviction widely diverse and
seemingly comparable offenders substantially different in their blame-
worthiness.
Second, definitions of offenses in U.S. law are typically broad: "rob-
bery" encompasses behavior ranging from gangland holdups to takings
of basketballs on school playgrounds. Punishing every person convicted
of robbery the same way would produce what Arie Freiberg (2001)
called "unjustifiable parity." The example I just gave is extreme, of
course, but the problem is a general one. Most guidelines systems di-
vide all felonies into a small number of categories of severity, and they
inevitably include widely diverse kinds of crimes. Because of wide dif-
ferences in any jurisdiction in charging and plea bargaining practices,
substantially similar crimes result in convictions for different crimes,
and conviction offenses obscure wide differences in underlying culpa-
ble behavior.
Third, most important, von Hirsch's desert theory is subject to the
"punishment of the innocents" charge that retributivists classically toss
at utilitarians. The logic of the system requires that all offenders who
fall within a category receive the same penalty, including when the
severity of punishment for that category is increased for preventive
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reasons relating to some but not all members of the category. What
this means is that some, perhaps many or most, offenders in a category
will be punished more severely than their offense warrants because the
architecture of the system requires it. 12 In the words of the classic
retributive critique of utilitarian punishment theories, the offenders
being punished more severely than they otherwise would be are being
"used" as means to the end of maintaining the formal structure of the
sentencing theory (Pincoffs 1991). As an ethical matter, it is difficult
to distinguish between knowingly punishing an innocent person and
knowingly punishing a guilty person more than he or she deserves.
A pure utilitarian model also has well-known practical limits, over
and above the punishment of the innocents problem. The overriding
one is that the necessary "felicific calculus," as Bentham called it, is
impossible. Fundamentally contested literatures on economic costs of
crime, especially pain and suffering (McDougall et al. 2006), deterrent
and incapacitative effects (Nagin 1998), and crime prevention more
broadly demonstrate that we are far away from a time when we know
enough to take the Benthamite model seriously. Any decisions about
the utilitarian gains and pains associated with punishment in an indi-
vidual case or within broad-based general policies can be little better
than guesswork.
On a continuum between those Kantian and Benthamite poles lie
hybrid punishment theories that combine retributive and preventive
considerations in diverse ways. One, proposed by Andrew von Hirsch
(1993), is that culpability concerns predominate heavily but that de-
terrent or incapacitative concerns may be taken into account in setting
the penalty scale. If longer sentences are wanted, they may be imposed
collectively on all equally culpable people, by moving that offense up
the scale or by extending the scale, and thereby punishing all offenders
more severely, but they may not be imposed on an individualized basis.
This is unsatisfactory because it forces a choice between forgoing
"This sentence conflates two separate problems. First, insofar as overbroad offense
definitions or charging and plea bargaining practices result in substantially different crimes
bearing the same label, sentencing all bearing that label in the same way punishes those
whose crimes were less serious more severely than they deserve. Second, as I explain
below in the text, von Hirsch would forbid the use of crime preventive considerations
(e.g., deterrence or incapacitation) to increase sentences for individuals and would instead
allow them to be taken into account only to increase sentences for the entire category
of offenses in which target individuals fall (von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005). The effect
would be to increase sentences for all in the category so that some can be punished more
severely for instrumental reasons.
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seemingly realizable preventive goals and gratuitously punishing some,
or many, in a class more severely than their crime would otherwise
merit. The former is politically and possibly ethically impracticable.
The latter violates the parsimony principle's injunction against impo-
sition of gratuitous suffering.13
A second hybrid theory, associated with Andrew von Hirsch and
Martin Wasik (Wasik and von Hirsch 1988), would permit preventive
considerations to influence the type but not the severity of punishment.
Punishments must be apportioned to blameworthiness; but if two pun-
ishments (e.g., X days of imprisonment versus Y days of community
service) have a comparable punitive bite, a choice may be made be-
tween them on preventive bases. Their proposal assumes, however, that
few penalties can be made comparably punitive and accordingly spec-
ifies that imprisonment is more severe than community-based punish-
ments; they in turn are more severe than fines, allowing for inter-
changeability only at the margins between types of punishments. This
is unsatisfactory generally because it is primarily a variation of the pre-
ceding hybrid theory and because it consigns preventive considerations
to the narrowest margins.
A third hybrid theory, proposed by Paul Robinson (1987), calls for
strict observance of culpability standards except in a small number of
cases for which disproportionate punishments would prevent really se-
rious harms. This is unsatisfactory for conceptual (how in principle
justify the abandonment of retributive premises?), definitional (what
harms count as really serious?), and empirical reasons (how can we
know we're additionally punishing the correct people? We're not very
good at predicting really serious future harms).
A fourth hybrid, proposed by former English civil servant John Hal-
liday (2001, app. 8), is described as being a form of limiting retribu-
tivism concerned with "consistency of approach rather than uniformity
of outcome" (p. 20). The notion is that the same set of punitive and
preventive considerations should be taken into account in every case,
but the seriousness of the offense would limit the maximum sentence
that should be imposed. This is at best obscure and implies something
closer to a theory of procedural than to a theory of substantive justice.
3 Von Hirsch's response (1993) would be that parsimony should be sought at collective
levels by setting the overall penalty scale as low as possible while furthering the aim of
treating like cases alike. General parsimony-based objections could be raised to this
position, but, importantly for the point made in the text, it does not speak to the special
problems involved in raising the overall scale to pursue preventive goals.
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It is in any case a very weak form of limiting retributivism in that the
upper limits of aggregate punishment that may be imposed are vaguely
expressed and are subject to major exceptions for serious offenses, re-
peat offenders, and offenders who fit into a very broad definition of
dangerousness (Tonry 2004a).
The fifth and sixth hybrids are other versions of limiting retributiv-
ism. In "asymmetric proportionality," culpability sets strict upper limits
on the sentence that may be imposed, but there are no lower limits
(Lappi-Seppdli 2001). Finnish law sets out fairly detailed statutory
principles that govern sentencing; they give pride of place to culpability
considerations but allow on a case-by-case basis for the operation of
other considerations including preventive considerations in a narrowly
defined set of cases. The Finnish system, however, operates in a coun-
try in which most sentences are measured in days or weeks, sentences
longer than a year are uncommon, and the total imprisonment rate
including pretrial detainees fluctuates between sixty and seventy per
100,000 population, less than a tenth the American rate. Finland has
no sentencing guidelines as Americans understand the term because
the latitude for unwarranted disparities is incomparably lower. Asym-
metric proportionality on the Finnish model is probably unsatisfactory
for American adoption because it depends on Finland's very different
punishment practices and penal culture and its application by career
cadres of judges and prosecutors who subscribe to its values.
In Norval Morris's limiting retributivism (1974), culpability sets up-
per limits and for some but not all crimes sets lower limits. Compared
with von Hirsch's proportionality doctrine, in which desert limits are
artificial, set relative to sentences for lesser and greater crimes, Morris's
are cultural. He famously urged that "not undeserved" was a more
useful conception of culpability constraints on punishment than "de-
served" because it is far easier for people to agree that a sentence is
undeservedly harsh or unduly lenient than that it is just right. Within
those bounds, however, for Morris, Bentham's parsimony principle,
cause no unnecessary or gratuitous pain, required that the least severe
"not undeserved" punishment be imposed.
Morris first set out his limiting retributivism argument in the early
1950s (Morris 1953), and it took its fullest form in his Future of Im-
prisonment (1974), before modern sentencing guidelines were more
than a gleam in anyone's eyes. There is no reason in Morris's argument
why the upper and lower bounds of allowable punishments cannot de-
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rive from policy decisions that grid-style guidelines made possible (as
long as they respect cultural limits), as his later writings showed (e.g.,
Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3).
It appeared clear to Morris in 1974 that preventive considerations
would seldom justify imposition of sentences more severe than the
parsimonious minimum. The most successful predictions of danger-
ousness were wrong at least two times out of three, too often to justify
confining people longer because they were purportedly dangerous, and
the research evidence concerning deterrence and rehabilitation gave no
grounds that either was sufficiently often effective' 4 to justify depri-
vations of liberty on their basis.
The world has changed since 1974 in ways germane to Morris's
analysis. Though the evidence concerning the effectiveness of deterrent
and incapacitative penalties is not much stronger now than it was then,
doubts about basing sentencing laws on them are much less influential.
More significantly, the research evidence on rehabilitative programs
has reversed, and both conventional wisdom and many meta-analyses
and literature reviews agree that well-run, well-targeted programs can
reduce reoffending rates (and drug abuse) (e.g., U.S. Surgeon General
2001; Farrington and Welsh, in this volume; Welsh and Farrington
2006).
This discussion of purposes supports two conclusions. First, as the
discussion of the federal guidelines at this subsection's beginning
showed, purposes have consequences and provide guidance that is nec-
essary if policies are to be coherent, internally consistent, and perceived
as just. Second, any coherent and practicable set of purposes will be
embodied in a hybrid model.
In the sections that follow, and in the conclusion, I propose that
both sentences imposed and legitimate functional goals pursued should
be consistent with whatever normative purposes are set. For myself,
and for most modern sentencing systems (Frase 1997, 2004, 2005a),
something like Morris's limiting retributivism appears best to express
the optimal balance of competing moral intuitions about punishment
and crime prevention, but reasonable people disagree about that.
"4 In these views he was ahead of his time; Martinson's "What Works?" article, sug-
gesting that existing evidence gave little basis for confidence in rehabilitative programs,
did not appear until 1974. The National Academy of Sciences report on deterrence and
incapacitation, whose conclusions Morris anticipated, did not appear until 1978 (Blum-
stein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978).
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B. Distribution
Whatever the applicable normative purposes of a sentencing system
may be, the principal distributive aims are consistency, evenhanded-
ness, and fairness relative to those purposes. Imposition of punishment
for crime is a paradigmatic instance of the conflict between individual
liberty and collective interests. Sentencing is a process in which gov-
ernment actors are empowered to intrude on individuals' liberty and
autonomy in order to prevent crimes and sanction wrongdoing. To be
consistent with core values underlying constitutional notions of due
process and equal protection, sentencing needs to respect offenders'
rights to be treated as equals, to have decisions about them made de-
liberately and impartially, and to be dealt with under fair procedures.
I would be surprised if many people disagree. A major challenge for
sentencing policy, however, is that consistency, evenhandedness, and
fairness look different when viewed from different places. To legisla-
tors, a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, three-strikes, or 100-
to-one law is not necessarily inconsistent with those values. Nor, pre-
sumably, to members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission were the
"actual-offense behavior" policies, drug-trafficking guidelines, or a de-
cision to forbid judges to take account in sentencing of ethically im-
portant differences in individual offenders' circumstances."5 From the
perspective of policy making at the wholesale level, the policies were
for Congress and the commission to set and for judges and prosecutors,
equably, evenhandedly, and fairly, to implement.
If literally applied in every case, however, those policies would have
made practitioners complicit in imposing sentences in many cases that
everyone directly involved believed to be substantively or procedurally
unjust. Practitioners see cases firsthand. Problems appear simpler the
farther away the point from which they are observed. District court
judges, whether liberal or conservative, or appointed by Republican or
Democratic administrations, for example, who see living, breathing de-
fendants, are more hostile to the federal guidelines than are appellate
judges who see only written appellate briefs. The same generalization
applies to laypeople. The more detailed the information people are
given about particular criminal cases, the less harsh and stereotyped
"s From the outset, the guidelines provided that such commonsense considerations as
family responsibilities, drug dependence, and mental health problems were not "ordinarily
relevant in determining whether the sentence should be outside the guidelines" (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1987, secs. 5H1.1-6).
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the sentences they would impose become. As a result, as surveys in a
number of countries show, the sentences laypeople would impose for
particular kinds of cases are often less severe than the sentences judges
do impose (Roberts et al. 2002).
Legislators and senior executive branch officials, by contrast, deal in
stereotypes. Often, like citizens responding to survey questions, they
think in terms of extreme cases, even when setting policies that will
mostly be applied to run-of-the-mill ones. They are also more likely
to think of sentencing policy in terms of its latent functions of self-
interest, ideology, and partisanship, considerations that are much less
likely to move practitioners when pondering an individual's fate.
Nearly all judges and prosecutors-"officers of the court" in American
legal systems-take their ethical obligation to do justice seriously. Pol-
icies that substantially obstruct their ability to do justice are likely to
be resisted or undermined.
The federal guidelines often directed judges to impose sentences
they believed to be unjustly severe (Zlotnick 2004)."6 In such circum-
stances, judges had three options: compliance, resignation, and circum-
vention. They could apply the guidelines as written, but at the cost of
behaving unjustly; most did this much of the time, occasionally after
announcing that they felt they had no alternative but to impose an
unjust sentence. They could announce that the guidelines required
them to impose an unjust sentence and, refusing to do so, resign. A
few did this. They could resolve neither to impose an unjust sentence
nor to defy the law openly nor to resign, but together with counsel
circumvent the guidelines to produce a sentence everyone involved
considered appropriate. Many did this, and increasing numbers did so
as time passed (Bowman and Heise 2001).
J. Lawrence Irving, the first federal district court judge to resign in
protest over the federal guidelines, was appointed by President Ronald
Reagan. On resigning in 1990, he said: "If I remain on the bench I
have no choice but to follow the law. I just can't, in good conscience,
continue to do this" (New York Times 1990, p. 2). Federal district court
judge John S. Martin resigned in 2003 over what he called "a sen-
tencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid" (Martin 2004, p.
" A U.S. Sentencing Commission survey in 2003 showed that 73.7 percent of district
judges and 82.7 percent of circuit judges said that federal drug-trafficking sentences are
inappropriately severe, which necessarily means that many judges appointed by Presidents
Reagan, Bush I, and Bush 1H held this view (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2003, exhibits
11-4, II-4).
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A3 1). Richard Boylan's statistical analyses concluded that the guide-
lines' unpopularity led judges on average to retire earlier than they
otherwise would have (Boylan 2004).
My personal experience working with judges and prosecutors is that
most practitioners most of the time want to do justice in individual
cases, to do the right thing, to achieve a just and appropriate sentence.
When applicable laws make that difficult or impossible, they still feel
powerfully moved to do so anyway.
This is human nature, and there is a lot of evidence for it, going
back centuries. Between 1714 and 1830, the British Parliament created
156 new capital crimes punishable by death, many of them property
offenses, but the number of executions fell by three-fourths. Why?
Because juries refused to convict offenders or convicted them for of-
fenses not punishable by death, and judges created and narrowly in-
terpreted technical rules that had to be followed if death was to be
imposed, but seldom were (Stephen [1883] 1977; Select Committee on
Capital Punishment 1930; Hay 1975).
The American Bar Foundation in the 1950s and 1960s carried out
major studies of criminal court operations in several states (Newman
1966; Dawson 1969; Miller 1969). Prosecutorial and judicial circum-
vention of mandatory sentences was common in each court studied.
Exemplifying this, Donald Newman described the application in Mich-
igan of a fifteen-year maximum sentence for nighttime burglary (com-
pared with a five-year maximum for daytime burglary): "The frequency
of altering nighttime burglary to breaking and entering in the daytime
led one prosecutor to remark: 'You'd think all our burglaries occur at
high noon"' (Newman 1966, p. 182). The maximum mattered so much
then and there because, taking time off for good behavior into account,
it set the date by which the parole board had to release a prisoner. A
lower maximum was insurance against a much longer stay in prison.
As Frank Remington, executive director of the nearly two-decades-
long series of projects, summarized, "Legislative prescription of a high
mandatory sentence for certain offenders is likely to result in a reduc-
tion of charges at the prosecution stage, or if this is not done, by a
refusal of the judge to convict at the adjudication stage. The issue . ..
thus is not solely whether certain offenders should be dealt with se-
verely, but also how the criminal justice system will accommodate to
the legislative change" (Remington 1969, p. xvii).
Evaluations of the effects of mandatory minimums enacted in the
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1970s in Massachusetts (Rossman et al. 1979), Michigan (Heumann
and Loftin 1979), and New York (Joint Committee 1978) reached the
same conclusions. So did an evaluation of Oregon's Measure 11, en-
acted by referendum in 1994 and requiring lengthy mandatory sen-
tences for people convicted of sixteen serious crimes (Merritt, Fain,
and Turner 2003, 2006). An evaluation of NewJersey's 1994 "No Early
Release Act," requiring offenders to serve 85 percent of their sentences
before release, hypothesized that changes in plea bargaining would
largely nullify the act and result in times served little different from
before the law took effect. That is what was found (McCoy and
McManimon 2003).
Experience with the federal guidelines was the same. During their
first decade, a host of studies, some sponsored by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, showed that circumvention of the guidelines' harshest
and most rigid provisions was commonplace (Nagel and Schulhofer
1992; Schulhofer and Nagel 1997). In recent years, Frank Bowman
and Michael Heise (2001) showed that a wide range of circumvention
techniques by prosecutors and judges resulted throughout the 1990s
in continuously decreasing average sentence lengths in the federal
courts.
The consistent evidence that practitioners often circumvent sen-
tencing laws mandating sentences they believe to be unjust should not
be surprising. James Eisenstein and his colleagues, reporting on re-
search on how practitioners in felony courts in nine counties reached
sentencing decisions, observe that sentences result from "accommo-
dations among competing values and interests that support these val-
ues, accommodations that are superimposed on a common basic struc-
ture supported by broad consensus." Of reforms imposed from outside,
they conclude that "the more radical a proposed change, the less likely
is its adoption" (Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli 1988, p. 294).
C. Prevention
The preventive functions focus on crime, fear of crime, and reduc-
tion in their costs and consequences. For purposes of this essay, I as-
sume that efforts to prevent crime will also lessen fear and reduce
crime's costs and consequences; that is a reasonable assumption, even
though a finer-tuned analysis would discuss different policy mecha-
nisms for achieving each outcome. 7
" A harm-reduction approach to drug policy, e.g., might imply different drug policy
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The preventive functions center on the collective interest in domes-
tic tranquility, on enabling citizens to get on with their lives in security.
These are core functions of the state and basic goals of criminal law
and punishment. If they are to be pursued effectively, policy makers
need to take account of the considerable body of knowledge on the
effectiveness of sanctions.
Precisely how crime prevention, fear reduction, and cost savings
should be sought involves policy decisions about which reasonable peo-
ple differ and depends in part on what normative purposes are deemed
applicable. I assume though that most policy makers regard crime pre-
vention as among the justifiable normative purposes even if some sets
of normative purposes that might be adopted might constrain the pol-
icy options available to pursue them. That being so, knowledge of what
works, and what doesn't, is essential.
Writing on this subject is a ticklish business because it is probably
generally assumed that the writer has axes to grind that shape how the
evidence is summarized. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is broad
agreement among academics of liberal (e.g., Ruth and Reitz 2003) and
conservative (e.g., Wilson 2002) political inclinations about conclusions
to be drawn from research on the preventive effects of criminal sanc-
tions and criminal justice interventions.
1. Deterrence. Current knowledge concerning deterrence is little
different than eighteenth-century theorists such as Beccaria ([1764]
1995) supposed it to be: certainty and promptness of punishment are
more powerful deterrents than severity. This does not mean that pun-
ishments do not deter. No one doubts that having a system of punish-
ment has crime-preventive effects. The important question is whether
changes in punishments have marginal deterrent effects, that is,
whether a new policy causes crime rates to fall from whatever level
they would otherwise have been at. Modern deterrent strategies,
through sentencing law changes, take two forms: increases in punish-
ments for particular offenses and mandatory minimum sentence (in-
cluding "three-strikes") laws.
Imaginable increases in severity of punishments do not yield signif-
icant (if any) marginal deterrent effects. Three National Academy of
approaches than are now common in the United States. Fear of crime can be addressed
by things such as increased visible police presence on the streets and improved neigh-
borhood conditions (e.g., more street lighting, prompt repair of vandalized public prop-
erty, altered traffic patterns) that lie far beyond the reach of the sentencing judge.
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Sciences panels, all appointed by Republican presidents, reached that
conclusion (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Blumstein, Cohen,
Roth, and Visher 1986; Reiss and Roth 1993), as has every major survey
of the evidence (Cook 1980; Nagin 1998, 1999; von Hirsch et al. 1999;
Doob and Webster 2003). This is also the belief, in my experience, of
most experienced judges and prosecutors.
There are a number of good practical reasons why this widely
reached conclusion makes sense. First, serious sexual and violent crimes
are generally committed under circumstances of extreme emotion, of-
ten exacerbated by the influence of alcohol or drugs. Detached reflec-
tion on possible penalties or recent changes in penalties seldom if ever
occurs in such circumstances. Second, most minor and middling and
many serious crimes do not result in arrests or prosecutions; most of-
fenders committing them, naively but realistically, do not expect to be
caught. Third, those who are caught and prosecuted almost always are
offered plea bargains that break the link between the crime and the
prescribed punishment. Fourth, when penalties are especially severe,
they are often, albeit inconsistently, circumvented by prosecutors and
judges. Fifth, for many crimes including drug trafficking, prostitution,
and much gang-related activity, removing individual offenders does not
alter the structural circumstances conducing to the crime. Sixth, even
when one ignores all those considerations, the idea that increased pen-
alties have sizable marginal deterrent effects requires heroic and un-
realistic assumptions about "threat communication," the process by
which would-be offenders learn that penalty increases have been leg-
islated or are being implemented.
Mandatory minimum penalties including three-strikes laws are noth-
ing more than efforts to deter crime through penalty increases. The
clear weight of the evidence, not surprisingly given what we know
about severity increases generally, is that they are seldom if ever crime
preventatives (e.g., Tonry 1996, chap. 4; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin
2001). Besides the not inconsiderable problem that mandatory mini-
mums often are circumvented by practitioners, and always will be, the
best evidence suggests that they have no marginal deterrent effects or
have only modest effects that quickly waste away.
There is no good evidence that justifies fine-tuning sentences in
individual cases, or enacting mandatory minimum sentence laws, for
deterrent reasons. Having a system of punishments has deterrent ef-
fects. Having punishments scaled to the severity of offenses should
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provide rational incentives, as Beccaria and Bentham urged; to commit
fewer rather than more serious crimes and, as Durkheim urged, to
reinforce basic social norms.
The principal implications of current knowledge about deterrence
are that certainty of punishment is more important than severity, that
penalties that are too rigid or too severe result in widespread circum-
vention, and accordingly that mandatory minimums and three-strikes
laws are ineffective, cause foreseeable injustices including gross dispar-
ities, and should be repealed.
2. Incapacitation. Incapacitative crime control strategies have some
potential if used discriminatingly for people who commit very serious
crimes at high rates (Monahan 2004). Offenders in confinement nec-
essarily are disabled from committing offenses in the free community.
We know a good bit more about incapacitation than we did thirty years
ago. For a time, policies referred to as "collective incapacitation" were
in vogue, influenced or at least evidenced by proposals in James Q.
Wilson's Thinking about Crime (1976): extend all sentences of people
convicted of violent crimes such as robbery by several years. This was
soon shown to be impracticable. Large numbers of people are con-
victed of such crimes, but the average likelihood of recidivism is too
low for the resulting huge increases in imprisonment to be justified
(Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Cohen 1983).
This was followed by proposals for "selective incapacitation," cata-
lyzed by a RAND Corporation report purporting to show the feasi-
bility of such policies (Greenwood and Abrahamse 1982). This was
soon discredited by a National Academy of Sciences report that showed
that RAND's proposals worked with hindsight-it was based on self-
reported past crimes of imprisoned violent offenders and in retrospect
seemed to characterize those prisoners-but not prospectively (Blum-
stein et al. 1986). The prediction methods proposed were so over-
inclusive, producing so many "false positives," that selective incapaci-
tation was dismissed as impracticable.
After that, the theoretical writing and related empirical research on
incapacitation pretty much came to a halt (Nagin 1998), but policy
makers kept increasing lengths of sentences and accepted the impris-
onment numbers that in the 1970s and early 1980s appeared unimag-
inable (Blumstein 1988). Collective incapacitation, in effect, became
national policy, though not under that name. Studies in the late 1990s
(Spelman 2000) and early in this century (Blumstein and Wallman
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2000) concluded that mass imprisonment had reduced crime rates by
10-25 percent.
That last conclusion needs to be taken with a grain of salt for two
reasons. First, comparable declines in crime rates occurred throughout
the Western world, and no country other than the United States quin-
tupled its imprisonment rate and experimented with mass imprison-
ment (Tonry 2004b, chap. 2). There is a reasonably good chance that
American crime rates would have fallen like every other Western coun-
try's. The contrast with Canada-a flat imprisonment rate of 100 per
100,000 population for forty years but crime rate trends closely par-
alleling those in the United States (Doob and Webster 2006)-is es-
pecially cautionary. Second, and no less important, the studies con-
cluding that incapacitation caused significant declines in crime rates
are based on exceedingly complex modeling, which like all such mod-
eling is highly vulnerable to the assumptions on which it is based and
the modeling technique used; even highly sophisticated modelers sel-
dom agree about either (viz., compare Webster, Doob, and Zimring
[2006] with Kessler and Levitt [1999] and Rosenfeld, Fornango, and
Baumer [2005a, 2005b] with Berk [2005]).
Incapacitative considerations have little legitimate place in decisions
about individual offenders. The principal difficulty is that current in-
capacitation policies often, and expensively, target the wrong people.
There are five main problems. First, incapacitation strategies targeted
on repeat serious offenders generally result in long sentences for older
offenders, most of whom in any case would soon desist from crime.
This is known as the problem of residual career length; most thirty-
or forty-year-old offenders are unlikely to continue as active offenders
for long. There may be other justifications for confining such offenders
for extended periods; but from an incapacitative perspective, such sen-
tences are expensive, inefficient, and largely ineffective.
Second, strategies that target repeat offenders, in earlier times gen-
erally called "habitual-offender" laws and now called "three-strikes"
laws, tend to ensnare socially inadequate, high-volume property of-
fenders for whose prevented crimes lengthy prison sentences costing
$40,000-$50,000 per year are not a sensible investment of public re-
sources.
Third, for many offenses, including particularly drug sales, drug traf-
ficking, and some gang-related crime, there is the "replacement" prob-
lem: offenders taken off the streets are quickly replaced by willing suc-
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cessors. Removing a seventeen-year-old drug dealer from an inner-city
street corner is seldom likely to stop drug dealing at that corner; plenty
of willing volunteers are usually waiting in the wings to step into what
looks to be a lucrative opportunity. Similarly, unless the gang itself is
completely destroyed, locking up one or several of its members will
not stop its illegal activities. Other, and new, members will step in to
replace their fallen comrades.
Fourth, there is the "false-positive" problem. For crimes of any sig-
nificant seriousness, we are not very good at predicting which offenders
will commit them in the future. For every "true positive" who will,
three or four others predicted to do so will not. From a cost-benefit
perspective, locking up all those people is not an obviously good in-
vestment of public resources. From a moral perspective, many people
are troubled by the thought of lengthy confinement of individuals not
because of their current crime but because they might commit another,
especially when we know most will not.
Fifth, there is the "true-but-trifling-positive" problem. We are pretty
good at predicting petty reoffending. David Farrington (1979) long ago
demonstrated that an offender who has been arrested nine times has
an 80 percent likelihood of being arrested again. This raises the cost-
benefit question already mentioned: Is it worth $40,000-$50,000 per
year to prevent shoplifting, minor thefts, acts of prostitution, or low-
level drug dealing? It also raises the moral question whether the dis-
proportionate character of a multiyear prison sentence for a person
convicted of such crimes can be justified.
As with deterrence, the answer is not to forgo efforts to incapacitate
offenders, but to do so intelligently. This means working hard at the
policy level to develop strategies targeting particular kinds of serious
offenders whose future behavior we can reasonably confidently predict
and whose averted crimes save substantial suffering. At the individual
level, however, it means limiting judges' authority to predicate sen-
tencing decisions on incapacitative ambitions.
3. Rehabilitation. Prevention through rehabilitation looks to be a
considerably more viable strategy in the early twenty-first century than
it did during the closing decades of the twentieth. The view that "noth-
ing works" was an important backdrop to the shift toward determinate
sentencing, the abolition of parole, and adoption of incapacitative and
deterrent crime control strategies. If we do not know how to reduce
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offenders' prospects for later offending, it is hard to justify giving
judges and parole boards broad discretion to individualize sentencing.
The prospects for rehabilitation, however, have changed radically.
Evidence is accumulating from many sources-individual evaluations,
meta-analyses (e.g., Lipsey and Landenberger 2006; Mitchell, Mac-
Kenzie, and Wilson 2006), literature reviews (e.g., Gaes et al. 1999;
U.S. Surgeon General 2001), and practical experience-that well-man-
aged, well-targeted programs can reduce participants' probability of
reoffending. A wide range of programs, including drug treatment, an-
ger management, cognitive-skills programs, sex offender treatment,
and various educational- and vocational-skills programs have been
shown to reduce reoffending (Gaes et al. 1999). A report from the
English Home Office, which underpinned a massive reorganization of
the English criminal justice system mandated by the Criminal Justice
Act of 2003, concluded that "a reasonable estimate at this stage is that,
if the [treatment] programmes are developed and applied as intended,
to the maximum extent possible, reconviction rates might be reduced
by 5-25 percentage points (i.e. from the present level of 56 percent
within two years to (perhaps) 40 percent)" (Halliday 2001, p. 7). The
most recent meta-analysis of the effects of cognitive-behavioral pro-
grams concluded that, on average, they reduced reoffending by 27 per-
cent (Lipsey and Landenberger 2006). The proliferation of drug courts
and prisoner reentry programs in the United States bears witness to
the widely shared perception that some things work.
That litany of positive findings does not mean that reducing reof-
fending rates is easy. The results obtained from a well-funded pilot
project, led by motivated people, cannot automatically be obtained by
institutionalizing a new program model throughout a jurisdiction. A
recent survey of violence prevention programs by the U.S. Surgeon
General (2001) concluded that many programs can reduce violent of-
fending but that the challenge is broad-based implementation. This is
nonetheless much better news than the state of the evidence twenty-
five years ago. We now know what we do; we need to figure out how
to do it on a large scale.
An important implication is that rigid sentencing policies obstruct
efforts to prevent crime through rehabilitation of offenders. For drug
and other treatment programs to work, they must be targeted to the
characteristics and needs of particular offenders, and this requires sen-
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tences to be individualized. With the fall of the nothing works psy-
chology goes much of the case for rigid sentencing standards.
4. Moral Education. Deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
are not needed to restrain most adults from selling drugs, burglarizing
houses, holding up convenience stores, or mugging passersby. Most
people's personal norms and values make predatory crime almost un-
thinkable. European scholars and theorists have long observed that the
criminal law's main function is "general prevention": reinforcement of
basic social norms that are learned in the home, the church, the school,
and the neighborhood (Lappi-Seppil 2001). These primary socializing
institutions must do the heavy lifting-what the criminal courts can do
is too little and too late for the criminal justice system to serve as a
primary socializing institution-but it is important that law and the
legal system reinforce those norms and not undermine them.
One implication, consistent with research findings on deterrence, is
that it is more important that crimes have consequences than that the
consequences be severe. Another, consistent with the research findings
on rehabilitation, is that the choice of sanctions should be tailored to
the circumstances of particular cases.
The evidence on the preventive effects of punishment all points in
the same direction. A sentencing system that sets firm upper limits on
punishments, scaled to offenders' culpability or the severity of their
crimes, but allows substantial individualization below those limits,
promises greater preventive effectiveness than current laws in the fed-
eral system or most states.
III. Ancillary Functions
The criminal justice system has limited material and manpower re-
sources. Prosecutors, presiding judges, and corrections managers need
to organize their offices, courtrooms, and programs to get the job done
as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible while trying to achieve
appropriate outcomes in individual cases.
Sentencing guidelines in some states have proved to be useful tools
in reconciling distributive, preventive, and management functions.
These guidelines have achieved reasonable consistency in sentences
imposed and have proved an effective tool for projecting the effects of
alternate policy proposals and thereby managing corrections resources
and controlling corrections budgets at a systems level. Although plea
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bargaining occurs everywhere, in the states with well-designed guide-
lines, bargaining takes place in the shadow of the guidelines and has
not been characterized by the widespread circumvention, and resulting
disparities, that characterized the federal system (Tonry 1996; Reitz
2001, 2005a; Frase 2 005c).
A. Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness
Court dockets are crowded, treatment resources are scarce, and cor-
rectional programs including prisons are overcrowded and underre-
sourced. Managers have to figure out how to juggle their budgets and
manpower to keep cases flowing, hold backlogs down, and prioritize
their resource allocations so that the most serious and important cases
receive the attention they warrant. Most courts and prosecutors' offices
have monthly case disposition and backlog targets; failure to meet them
is interpreted as laziness or ineffectiveness. This is generally under-
stood to mean that most cases must be resolved as quickly as possible.
Trials should be avoided whenever possible, and bench trials are pref-
erable to jury trials.
Plea bargaining is the mechanism for achieving most of those goals
and requires that the state have something to offer the defendant to
induce cooperation and that prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges
get along. Generally, the parties do get along because many criminal
court practitioners work for extended periods in the same setting and
soon learn the prevailing conventions ("going rates") and get to know
the relatively small number of people in the courtroom in which they
work.
Peter Nardulli and his collaborators in the most extensive study to
date of courtroom communities put it like this: "The web of interper-
sonal ties and mutual need that holds the [courtroom community] to-
gether also creates norms and understandings that guide and restrict
behavior. In a sense court communities emerge because of the need to
establish these understandings, as well as to meet other human needs
... . It is in the interest of all to establish, abide by, and enforce a
common set of understandings about how normal cases should be han-
dled and how defendants should be punished" (Nardulli, Eisenstein,
and Flemming 1988, p. 306).
People who are oppositional or uncooperative soon find that they
receive little cooperation back and that they are felt by their colleagues
to be unreasonable. Those are pretty effective sanctions for uncoop-
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erative behavior: "The importance attached to conflict avoidance and
conflict management is another important component of the court
community's court culture. In some communities, a great deal of em-
phasis was placed upon going along and getting along, upon not rock-
ing the boat" (Nardulli, Eisenstein, and Flemming 1988, p. 125).
Lawyers and judges become socialized into the local courtroom cul-
ture, which, given that felony courts are usually staffed by people from
the communities they serve, generally reflects prevailing community
notions about right and wrong and the severity of punishment. People
working in big-city courts tend to have somewhat different local cul-
tures than people working in suburban and small-town courts. Legal
cultures vary from city to city and region to region (Eisenstein, Flem-
ming, and Nardulli 1988). A U.S. Sentencing Commission-sponsored
study of prosecutorial circumvention of guidelines documented wide
variations in legal culture in different federal district courts (Nagel and
Schulhofer 1992).
What practitioners do largely depends on the prevailing courtroom
culture. If sentencing statutes and guidelines set standards that are in-
compatible with local traditions and beliefs, local traditions often win
out, with the acquiescence of everyone involved. Practitioners' needs
to achieve management goals and the importance of local courtroom
cultures together mean that local courts will do what is needed to
operate efficiently and cost-effectively and to achieve outcomes that
those involved consider appropriate and just. Sentencing standards that
are too harsh, too lenient, or too mechanistic often will be circum-
vented.
B. Resource Management
Governments and individual agencies need to get their business done
within the resource constraints presented by their budgets. They need
to be able to predict changes in their likely flow of work and to plan
for resources they will need in the future. These things inevitably entail
choices.
One of the great advantages of sentencing guidelines is that they are
a proven tool for effective resource management (Boerner and Lieb
2001; Wright 2002; Frase 2005b). States that adopted sentencing
guidelines as a resource management tool have successfully tailored
their sentencing policies to their correctional budgets and programs.
By making sentencing decisions predictable in the aggregate, guidelines
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enable policy makers to project likely future resource needs. If, for
example, a jurisdiction contemplates doubling sentence lengths for sex
crimes, it can project how many more prison beds will be needed. If
current and planned facilities cannot accommodate the increased num-
bers, policy makers can respond in a number of ways. They can ap-
propriate funds to build new facilities, revise sentences for other of-
fenses downward to free up the needed spaces, reconsider whether the
sex offender proposal is a good idea, or do some combination of these
things.
Sound resource management is a necessary characteristic of effective
government and a primary rationale for sentencing guidelines systems.
Its scope should extend to needs for nonincarcerative sanctions, avail-
ability of appropriately targeted rehabilitative programs, and effectua-
tion of appropriately targeted incapacitation policies.
C. Communication
Communicative functions are described briefly, not because they are
less important than the other functions but because the basic propo-
sitions can be simply stated. Communicative functions interact with
normative, distributive, and preventive functions. Legitimacy and pub-
lic confidence depend in part on whether the law is seen to operate
reasonably and in ways that are consonant with widely held ideas about
justice (including, e.g., that claims be fairly considered and that pen-
alties be proportionate to the severity of crimes).
1. Legitimacy. Legitimacy is increasingly recognized as a key ele-
ment in how people relate to government (Tyler 2003). Whether peo-
ple have confidence in, support, and cooperate with public institutions
is influenced by the institution's legitimacy in their eyes. People are
more likely to react positively when the police stop them, or to accept
an adverse decision by a court, if they believe that they have been
treated fairly, that decisions about them have been evenhanded and
impartial, and that they have had a chance to have their say. Sentencing
policies that respect offenders' rights to be treated as equals, to have
decisions about them made deliberately and impartially, and to be dealt
with under fair procedures are more likely to be perceived as legitimate
than policies that do not satisfy these requirements of procedural jus-
tice.
2. Public Reassurance. Sometimes laws are enacted or policies are
adopted to "send a message" that the public's views have been noted
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or that their anxiety, apprehension, or unhappiness has been noted.
Sociologist David Garland (2001) argues that much recent crime con-
trol policy in the United States and England was adopted primarily for
"expressive" reasons, not because policy makers necessarily thought
that new, tougher policies would reduce crime rates but because they
wanted to reassure an anxious public that was fearful of rising crime
rates and troubled by the uncertainties of a rapidly changing world.
Legislators have long adopted symbolic policies meant primarily to
acknowledge public anxiety. Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York,
for example, according to the New York Times, conceded that two
amendments he successfully offered to federal crime legislation, "which
Justice Department officials sa[id] would have little practical effect on
the prosecution of crimes, might not solve the problem. 'But,' he said,
'it does bring about a sense that we're serious"' (Ifill 1991, p. A6). The
seeming eighteenth-century English paradox that many more crimes
were made punishable by death during a century in which the number
of executions rapidly and substantially declined is generally explained
in expressive terms; legislators were trying to stress the seriousness of
the new death-eligible offenses, generally property crimes, even though
there was little appetite for executing property offenders (Hay 1975).
3. Public Confidence. For nearly a decade the English government
has explained major changes in criminal justice policy as parts of a
larger effort to increase public confidence in the legal system (e.g.,
Home Office 2002). The criminal justice system is believed by the
English government to lack credibility in the eyes of voters, and mea-
sures meant to make punishments harsher and more certain and con-
victions more likely are portrayed as parts of a larger campaign to
increase public confidence in the legal system and generally. This is in
effect a collective, bystander's parallel to legitimacy. Public confidence
in the legal system is likely to increase if it is seen to be addressing
problems that trouble citizens effectively.
4. Reinforcement of Basic Social Norms. This is the corollary of the
preventive function of "moral education." That is why Scandinavian
countries attach great significance to proportionality in punishment (so
that the severity of sanctions acknowledges the comparative seriousness
of crimes) and more frequently impose prison sentences (though
shorter ones) and their equivalents than most other countries do (so
criminal behavior has consequences) (Lappi-Seppi 2001).
Conversely, if the law's treatment of crimes is incompatible with
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basic social norms, the effect will be to undermine the legitimacy of
the legal system. At times, for example, when cannabis is treated as a
dangerous drug on par with heroin or crack cocaine, enforcement be-
comes lax and inconsistent, and the legal system is seen by many as
being out of step with prevailing behavioral norms. Or when drug
trafficking in small amounts is treated as being more serious than rape,
manslaughter, or serious assault, it is clear that the legislature is out of
step. Recent prosecutions and severe punishments in white-collar crime
cases offer an example of the system responding to a widespread public
perception that it was unjust that corporate malefactors in crimes in-
volving hundreds of millions of dollars often received milder punish-
ments than less privileged citizens convicted of much less serious
crimes.
A few strong inferences can be drawn from these observations about
communicative functions. First, they fit together: people expect legal
institutions to be fair, consistent, rational, and in step with prevailing
social norms. Second, public confidence and reassurance are likelier to
be achieved by fair, consistent, and rational policies and practices than
by expressive and symbolic policies that lack those qualities. It is hard
to imagine, for example, that statutes that call for five-, ten-, and
twenty-year minimum sentences for drug crimes, which are routinely
circumvented and thereby lack legitimacy and fail to mirror prevailing
social norms, have greater positive effects on public reassurance and
confidence than more moderate laws would.
I. Latent Functions
The latent functions of sentencing and sentencing policy-using sen-
tencing to achieve personal, ideological, or partisan political goals-
sometimes fundamentally obstruct performance of sentencing's pri-
mary and ancillary functions. Many practitioners and policy makers
hanker for more lucrative or powerful jobs. Elected officials want to
be reelected and aspirants want to be elected for the first time. Pros-
ecutors and judges sometimes call for or impose unusually severe pun-
ishments to win favor with voters or party leaders. Legislators propose
and vote for new laws for those reasons. Many practitioners and policy
makers have strong ideological beliefs and want to bear witness to their
beliefs. Policy makers sometimes want to posture before ideological
soul mates and make symbolic statements. Policy makers sometimes
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subordinate their personal beliefs to achievement of partisan political
goals.
A. Self-Interest
Purely personal ambitions and self-serving motives are illegitimate
considerations in decision making by prosecutors and judges about in-
dividual cases. Performance of the distributive, preventive, and com-
municative functions is undermined when cases are dealt with in a
particular way because a practitioner believes she is likelier to gain a
nomination, win an election, or obtain a new job. Retributive theories
of punishment call for punishments to reflect the personal culpability
and harm associated with an offense. Utilitarian and mixed theories
call for punishments to be based at least in part on good-faith assess-
ments of their likely crime-preventive effects. No theory justifies pun-
ishments based on substantively unrelated ulterior considerations. De-
cisions based on practitioners' personal self-interest are in effect
whimsical or arbitrary and irreconcilable with any prevailing theory of
punishment.
The analysis is somewhat more complicated for legislators and other
policy makers, primarily because the issues of self-interest are some-
times more opaque. When a prosecutor or judge treats an offender in
a particular way to realize a purely personal goal, there is no arguable
public benefit that can be said to outweigh or counterbalance the harm
done the offender. When an entirely self-motivated legislator votes to
support a particular policy for which there is little substantive justifi-
cation, but claims in good faith to be trying to reassure the public or,
more complicatedly, claims a need to vote in a particular way on this
subject in order to win others' support for a vote on a more important
subject, it is almost impossible to assess what the real motives are. The
governing ethical premise, however, should be the same as for a pros-
ecutor or a judge: only disinterested motives are legitimate. Observers
may have difficulty knowing policy makers' motives, but they them-
selves know whether their motives are legitimate or ignoble. A good
ethical litmus test is whether a legislator at a press conference could
comfortably and completely truthfully explain his or her motives.
In the introduction I described a judge up for a vigorously contested
reelection who in a particular case, to win favorable publicity, might
impose a much harsher sentence than in his own mind can be justified,
and I suggested that few observers who knew why he had done so
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would approve. The analysis of policy making predicated on pursuit of
instrumental latent goals is the same as that which applies to a judge
who bases the sentence he imposes on his electoral hopes. A legislator
or governor who proposes or enacts policy changes he knows will not
achieve their purported aims and will, if enacted, cause new injustices,
because he hopes his support for the new policy will help him get
reelected, is behaving unethically.
The entanglement of sentencing policy in individuals' self-interest
has been especially acute at the federal level. Repeatedly in this essay
I have used examples from the federal sentencing guidelines. A major
reason why they were so inadequate and disliked was that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's policy making in its formative years became
entangled in the personal ambitions of William Wilkins, the first chair
(initially, unsuccessfully, to become FBI director, then successfully to
become a federal court of appeals judge), and Stephen Breyer (suc-
cessfully, to get to the Supreme Court). Wilkins had been a senior
staffer to Senator Strom Thurmond and Breyer had been chief of staff
to Senator Edward Kennedy when the two senators were successively
chairmen of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Breyer's cross-aisle po-
litical credibility was such that Senate confirmation of his appointment
as a federal court of appeals judge occurred in October 1980, just be-
fore the presidential election, at a time when Republicans otherwise
were refusing to act on President Carter's judicial nominations. Wil-
kins's and Breyer's judicial ambitions meant that a major function of
the guidelines was to win favor with Strom Thurmond and his personal
staff in the Senate in particular, with congressional Republicans more
generally, and with Ed Meese's Justice Department (von Hirsch 1988;
Tonry 1996, p. 84). Tens of thousands of federal defendants paid a high
price for Wilkins's and Breyer's judicial appointments.
Sometimes penal policies are proposed for reasons having nothing
to do with the goals of punishment per se. The prison guards union
in California, for example, is often said to promote harsher policies as
means to the ends of job creation and maintenance (Petersilia 2003,
pp. 237-38). Many communities have sought placement of prisons
within their boundaries and, implicitly, increased use of imprisonment,
as a form of economic development (p. 239). On the face of it these
considerations are entirely unrelated to punishment and prevention.
All the things I have described and decried happen and no doubt
will continue to. Anyone who reads newspapers knows that. That is
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the world we will continue to live in, but practitioners and policy mak-
ers can be more self-aware, intellectually honest, and transparent, and
the rest of us can try to hold them to account.
B. Ideological Expression
Crime control policy in our time has become entangled in ideolog-
ical conflict. Recent conflicts over medical use of marijuana and
Oregon's assisted-suicide law offer front-page examples. Voters initially
in California and eventually in more than a half dozen states approved
referenda authorizing medical use of marijuana. Voters in Oregon, ini-
tially by a narrow margin and later by a wide margin, approved a law
allowing physicians in narrowly defined circumstances to provide drugs
to mentally competent, terminally ill patients who want to die. In gen-
eral under American constitutional doctrines of federalism, criminal
justice policy is within the purview of the states (Richman, in this vol-
ume).
Public health and the regulation of medical practice also are gen-
erally recognized as matters of state law, but that has not stopped ideo-
logically motivated federal officials from trying to control state policies.
Successive U.S. Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Alberto Gon-
zales have attempted to use tortured readings of federal drug laws to
overrule the decisions by Oregon voters to allow doctors to assist su-
icides and by California voters to allow doctors to prescribe marijuana
for health care reasons. In each case, the federal government threat-
ened to act under federal drug laws against doctors who complied with
the state laws. The U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the effort in the
Oregon case, in Gonzales v. Oregon (126 S. Ct. 904 [2006]), but, in
Gonzales v. Raich (125 Supreme Court 2195 [2005]), supported the fed-
eral government's position concerning medical use of marijuana.
Ideology is at least as powerful an influence on sentencing policy.
Drug policy offers stark examples. The federal 100-to-one law punishes
people, mostly black, convicted of crack cocaine offenses as severely as
people, many white, convicted of powder cocaine offenses involving
amounts that are 100 times larger. The law was enacted in 1986, after
the much-publicized death, generally attributed to a crack overdose, of
Len Bias, a University of Maryland basketball player forecast to be-
come a National Basketball Association superstar (Kennedy 1997). The
law's role in exacerbating racial disparities in federal prisons soon be-
came clear (McDonald and Carlson 1993), and the U.S. Sentencing
Purposes and Functions
Commission proposed that the differential be eliminated. Both the
Clinton White House and the Congress opposed any change, and none
was made. In later years Attorney General Janet Reno, Drug Czar
Barry McCaffrey, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed that
the differential be reduced. The Clinton and Bush II White Houses
opposed all changes, and the differential remains. No one presumably
wants federal sentencing laws to worsen racial disparities, but neither
successive administration nor congressional leaders have been willing
to risk being accused of condoning drug use or trafficking (Tonry
2004b, chap. 1).
Mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws, for other examples, of-
ten are primarily based on ideology. Research findings discussed in
earlier sections make it clear, and for at least a century have made it
clear, that such laws seldom achieve their putative goals and always
produce undesirable and unwanted consequences. Ideological postur-
ing is no better an explanation for why an offender is punished unjustly
than is a judge's hope for reelection.
C. Partisan Advantage
Pursuit of partisan advantage is the most cynical of the latent func-
tions. Ideological influences grow out of deeply held beliefs; those be-
liefs may sometimes be blinding. Self-interested acts can, of course, be
criticized, but as long as men aren't angels they will remain at least
psychologically understandable. Decisions made for partisan reasons,
by contrast, are made in cold calculation. Partisan influences often re-
sult in the passage of laws that cannot be justified on the substantive
merits and foreseeably produce unjust results. Republican Senator Or-
rin Hatch, according to a member of his staff, for example, long be-
lieved reducing sentences for drug offenders "was the right thing to
do, but he couldn't do it for political reasons" (Gest 2001, p. 214).
California's three-strikes law, according to Frank Zimring's account,
resulted from politicians' competing attempts to use punishment pol-
icies to pursue partisan advantage. It was enacted not because thought-
ful policy makers really believed that people who stole pizza slices in
schoolyards or handfuls of compact discs from Wal-Mart deserved
decades-long prison sentences, but because Republican Governor Pete
Wilson and California Assembly leader Willie Brown played a game
of chicken in which, in the end, neither backed down. Democratic
legislators agreed among themselves to pass any proposal Governor
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Wilson offered, in hopes "that he would back down from an unquali-
fied 'get tough' stand or be politically neutralized if he persisted." Wil-
son did not blink. Nor did the Democrats. The law was passed as
proposed because both sides were "unwilling to concede the ground
on 'getting tough' to the other side in the political campaign to come."
Neither Wilson nor Brown was willing to propose refinements to Wil-
son's extreme initial proposal and thereby expose himself and his party
to the other's accusation of softness. As a result California adopted the
most far-reaching, rigid, and unjust three-strikes law in the country
(Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001, p. 6).
Former president Bill Clinton famously decided in the 1980s never
to let the Republicans get to his right on controversial crime control
issues, no matter how unjust, wasteful, or ineffective the policies under
consideration (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Friedman 1993). Clinton him-
self in 1994 admitted that "I can be nicked on a lot but nobody can
say I'm soft on crime" (Tonry 2004b, p. 8). It worked for Clinton but
not for the tens of thousands of people whose lives were changed for
the worse.
Britain's Labour Party, after a trip to Washington by Tony Blair to
meet with Clinton's political advisors, did the same thing in 1993
(Downes and Morgan 2002). Since then England has adopted sen-
tencing laws of unprecedented severity, and the prison population has
reached historic highs and has increased more rapidly since 1994 than
in any other Western country (Tonry 2004a).
Latent functions and to a lesser extent communicative functions pose
a formidable problem for principled policy making. They are not pri-
marily aimed at what goes on in courtrooms or on punishments im-
posed, crimes prevented, or efficiency enhanced, but on reputations
developed, political goals achieved, and elections won.
V. Reconciling Purposes and Functions
In principle, only normative purposes and primary and ancillary func-
tions should count. Thought of as machinery meant to produce some-
thing of value, a sentencing system's most important functions, most
people would agree, are the imposition of deserved punishments and
the prevention of crime. Political maneuvers and passions sometimes
result in the passage of laws that produce injustices, and practitioners
may sometimes impose unjust sentences for idiosyncratic (e.g., an emo-
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tional reaction to a particular offense or offender) or corrupt (e.g., to
gain reelection or curry favor) reasons. But it is hard to imagine that
many people think that is a good way to make policy or that unjust
outcomes in individual cases are a good thing. Some of the main an-
cillary functions-addressing administrative concerns for efficiency,
cost-effectiveness, and resource management-are regularly challenged
on normative or policy grounds. In practice, though, the latent func-
tions always powerfully shape policy and sometimes shape practice.
I do not kid myself that my or any other academic's disparagement
of policy makers' motives is important or likely to influence policy
makers to behave differently. It does, however, seem to me important
that academics describe what they see and speak truth to power when
opportunity arises.
Researchers and theorists can, however, work to develop better ways
of understanding sentencing and sentencing policy. We need, for ex-
ample, to devise new normative theories to encompass ways the world
has changed since desert theories took shape in the 1970s (Tonry
2005b). In the early years of the twenty-first century, many people
believe that efforts should be made to rehabilitate offenders, and a
substantial body of credible evidence shows that sometimes, in well-
targeted, well-run programs, this can be done. New restorative and
communitarian conceptions of justice are taking shape and programs
based on them are proliferating. Recent initiatives such as drug, family
violence, and mental health courts are being established across the
country as are new programs to divert many offenders from prosecu-
tion or prison into treatment. Most of these developments are hap-
pening and will continue to happen even though they are hard to rec-
oncile with prevailing retributive theories of punishment. If theorists
want to try to influence policy for the good and to be able at least to
offer models and ways of thinking that will help policy makers make
better choices, the work of developing new theories needs to be done.
That theorizing needs, however, to take account of all normative
purposes and primary and ancillary functions. Practitioners want to act
justly and to prevent crime effectively, if they can, but they also need
to manage their offices efficiently, work within resource constraints,
and allocate their efforts among multiple objectives. Most sentencing
theories address the primary distributive and preventive functions of
punishment, but I know of none that attempt also to encompass the
major ancillary functions.
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Ignoring the ancillary functions forces their influence into the shad-
ows and often, as happened with the federal guidelines, produces out-
comes of the sort Judge Marvin Frankel (1972) referred to as "lawless."
By that he meant that sentencing in the 1970s was not subject to rules
and was vulnerable to idiosyncratic and arbitrary decision making, and
the resulting sentences often said more about the judge than about the
offender. Bringing the ancillary functions within the frameworks for
thinking about principles governing punishment and prevention will
make explicit much that has been invisible and, maybe, achieve greater
fairness and justice overall.
Much empirical evidence shows that well-managed guidelines sys-
tems can make sentencing more predictable and consistent. A quarter
century's experience shows how guidelines' multiple functions can be
reconciled in ways that achieve broad support from practitioners and
reasonably consistent patterns of sentences imposed while allowing ju-
risdictions to take account of valid management concerns including
resource allocation. The key elements are the development of guide-
lines that classify offenses and offenders in reasonable ways, that au-
thorize sentences that accord with the sensibilities of the judges and
prosecutors charged to apply them, and that allow sufficient flexibility
for the individualization of sentences to take account of special circum-
stances.
The goal is a sentencing system that is fair, evenhanded, and con-
sistent, that takes realistic account of key management interests, and
that optimizes legitimacy, public reassurance, and public confidence.
We know how to do that.
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